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“HASHING” IN THE CLOUD:
THE PRIVATE SEARCH DEFENSE
IS ACTIVE AND POTENT
Tri Truong*
THE touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, for itconcerns the realm of individual liberty, not expediency in law en-forcement.1 And it is in this light that the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized a person’s constitutionally protected “reasonable expectation of
privacy.”2 The private search doctrine evolved in response to contempo-
rary developments to enable the government to repeat a search previ-
ously executed by a private party without violating the Fourth
Amendment insofar as the latter search does not exceed the scope of the
private conduct.3 The rationale is that once information is unveiled by a
private search, the expectation of privacy is defeated.4 This note will ex-
amine the Fifth Circuit’s application of the private search doctrine to
searches of electronic files, and briefly discuss an alternative analysis
under the single-purpose container doctrine.
The rise of the private search defense is a troubling development, par-
ticularly in the electronic era, as third parties have become indispensable
surrogates, allowing the police to eschew violating Fourth Amendment
protections in ways that they themselves could not perform absent a
search warrant. A common example is hash value or “hashing” technol-
ogy used by private entities to track digital images and compare them to
known child pornography in certain national libraries.5 The hash function
utilizes an algorithm to trawl large amounts of electronic information in-
discriminately and assign “unique identifiers” to the files.6 A fundamen-
tal principle of hashing is that the hash itself must not reveal any
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2019; B.S., Texas A&M, May
2008. I would like to thank my family for their support. I am also grateful to Professor
Jenia Turner, Professor Cassie DuBay, and my colleagues for their helpful comments.
1. United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636, 637 (5th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. Nov. 19, 2018) (No. 18-6734).
2. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
3. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115–16 (1984).
4. Id. at 117.
5. See Reddick, 900 F.3d at 636–37.
6. See id. at 637; Alexandra L. Mitter, Deputizing Internet Service Providers: How the
Government Avoids Fourth Amendment Protections, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 235,
260 (2011).
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information about the input data.7 Facing an unending distribution of on-
line child pornography and the dilemma that the private search doctrine
would place police activities beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment,
courts struggle to resolve the tension between an individual’s privacy in
the digital sphere and the utility of the government search. In attempting
to strike the proper balance, the Fifth Circuit understandably erred.
In United States v. Reddick, the Fifth Circuit was presented with a novel
question: whether the user had any remaining expectation of privacy after
a private party’s hash value analysis of the uploaded files revealed a
match of child pornography such that a warrant was necessary to permit
police to view the images.8 The Fifth Circuit erroneously held that the
Fourth Amendment was not implicated when the officer viewed the
images reported by the third-party as matching the hash values of known
images of child pornography.9 By oversimplifying and expanding the
scope of the private search exception in this narrow context, the Fifth
Circuit radically altered Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In effect,
Reddick not only erodes Fourth Amendment protections, but also invites
practical mischief and creates a significant disincentive for police to seek
a warrant. Reddick is further exacerbated by a potential split with the
Tenth Circuit.
The defendant, Henry Reddick (Reddick), uploaded his computer files
to a cloud storage system operated by Microsoft.10 Microsoft utilized a
proprietary software to automatically detect the hash values of Reddick’s
electronic files and compared the results with the hash values of known
images of child pornography.11 This software allows the identification of
illicit content (such as child pornography) without actually exposing the
images to viewers.12
When the software intercepted Reddick’s files based on the corre-
sponding hash values of apparent child pornography in the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) database,
Microsoft copied the unopened electronic files and sent them together
with Reddick’s subscriber information to NCMEC.13 NCMEC, without
opening the files, confirmed the hash value match and forwarded that
information to local law enforcement for further investigation.14 Upon
receiving the reports, the detective visually confirmed that the images de-
picted child pornography prior to securing a warrant.15 After the police
executed a warrant and searched Reddick’s residence, they found addi-
7. Stephen Hoffman, An Illustration of Hashing and Its Effect on Illegal File Content
in the Digital Age, 22 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L. J. 6, 7 (2010).
8. See Reddick, 900 F.3d at 638.
9. Id. at 639–40.
10. Id. at 637.
11. Id. at 637–38.
12. United States v. Reddick, No. 2:16-CR-928, 2017 WL 1353803, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 13, 2017), aff’d, 900 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2018).
13. Id. at *3.
14. Id.
15. Reddick, 900 F.3d at 638.
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tional evidence of child pornography in Reddick’s possession.16
Reddick was charged with possession of child pornography.17 He
moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that the officer’s viewing of
the images exceeded the scope of the private search, and therefore, the
exclusionary rule barred the admission of any additional evidence of child
pornography found in his home.18 On that record, the district court nev-
ertheless found that, even assuming that the officer’s viewing of the
images exceeded the private party’s search, the police acted in good faith
when they relied upon the warrant’s apparent validity to search Red-
dick’s residence.19 The district court therefore denied his motion.20
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision under
the private search doctrine.21 The Supreme Court articulated the private
search doctrine in Walter v. United States,22 and further elaborated in
United States v. Jacobsen.23 Walter involved the FBI’s warrantless viewing
of obscene filmstrips which had been mistakenly delivered to a private
party who then turned them over to the agency.24 The labels on the exter-
iors of the boxes indicated that the films contained pornographic activi-
ties.25 Prior to contacting the FBI, an employee attempted, without
success, to view the film by holding it up to the light.26 In a plurality
opinion, the Supreme Court held that the subsequent warrantless screen-
ing of the films by federal agents was an unlawful extension of the private
search because the agents’ inquiry was more intrusive than the private
party’s original visual inspection of the labels. 27 The Court reasoned that
the projection of the films was a “significant expansion” of the private
party’s search because, prior to the screening of the films, agents could
only draw inferences about the contents of the films based on their la-
bels.28 Put simply, the sender’s expectation of privacy was not wholly
stripped when the employees opened the packages to reveal the labels on
the boxes because the unfrustrated portion of the encroachment would
nonetheless remain.29 Thus, the additional search by the FBI breached
the remaining portion of the sender’s expectation of privacy that had not




19. Id. The good faith exception is available when law enforcement reasonably relied
on a warrant, but it is later found to be defective. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
926 (1984).
20. Reddick, 900 F.3d at 638.
21. Id.
22. 447 U.S. 649, 658–59 (1980).
23. 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984).
24. Walter, 447 U.S. at 651–52.
25. Id. at 652.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 657–58.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 658–59.
30. See id.
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In Jacobsen, the Court clarified that the “additional invasions of . . .
privacy by the government agent must be tested by the degree to which
they exceeded the scope of the private search.”31 There, employees of
Federal Express opened a damaged package and found several plastic
bags of a white, powdery substance concealed in layers of crumpled news-
paper.32 They then notified the Drug Enforcement Administration, who
conducted a visual inspection as well as chemical field tests on the white
powder and determined the powder was cocaine.33 The Court held that
the agents did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment by physically ex-
amining the powder because any expectation of privacy had already been
thwarted when the employees examined the package and discovered the
white powder.34 The Court reasoned that the field tests, which deter-
mined whether a particular substance is cocaine, did not infringe the de-
fendants’ privacy interest because the field tests could reveal “no other
arguably ‘private’ fact.”35
The Reddick court, relying on Jacobsen, curiously held that when the
detective opened and viewed the images, that was not a significant expan-
sion of the private search sufficient to constitute a separate search.36 The
court reasoned that, like Jacobsen, when Reddick uploaded the “pack-
age” of digital files, it “was inspected and deemed suspicious by a private
actor.”37 It follows that Reddick had no reasonable expectation that the
contents of his files would remain free from inspection by the government
following Microsoft’s search.38 Thus, when the government opened and
viewed the files—”akin to the government agents’ decision to conduct
chemical tests on the white powder in Jacobsen”—that was a step taken
merely to “dispel[ ] any residual doubt about the contents of the files.”39
Consequently, the court concluded that the government learned nothing
from the viewing of the files to the extent that those files had already
been examined by a private party.40
The problem with the court’s analysis is that it incorrectly treated the
hash identification of the files as the equivalent of evidence of contraband
and permitted hindsight to color the evaluation of the reasonableness of
the search. Here, the private search could only disclose whether there was
a positive match of child pornography. While hashing has been a power-
ful tool for detecting known images of child exploitation, the district
court explained that “one cannot recreate an image or determine its con-
31. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984) (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 111.
33. Id. at 111–12.
34. Id. at 120, 126.
35. Id. at 123.
36. United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636, 639 (5th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed,
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tent solely from its hash value.”41 This observation is consistent with the
basic properties of a hash function. It is one thing to say that “hash value
comparison ‘allows law enforcement to identify child pornography with
almost absolute certainty,’”42 and another that the electronic file is, in
fact, contraband, without viewing the electronic images or the corre-
sponding source materials. In a similar vein, to say that “[t]he govern-
ment effectively learned nothing from [the detective’s] viewing of the
files”43 after a private search is to accept the shortcomings of hindsight
judgment and ignore the fact that the Fourth Amendment not only pro-
tects against unreasonable searches, but also prevents police abuses.
Moreover, the court erroneously analogized the detective’s viewing of
the electronic files to the chemical tests in Jacobsen for two reasons. First,
his visual inspection, unlike hashing or a chemical test, could reveal not
only a binary response, but also the potential discovery of non-contra-
band or other incriminating information.44 Indeed, the Jacobsen Court
stated that “[the chemical tests] could tell him nothing more, not even
whether the substance was sugar or talcum powder.”45 Thus, the court’s
conclusion that subsequent review of the files was not an expansion of the
private search ignores its multiplying effect. In this respect, Professor
Orin Kerr’s observation is apt: “The opener of the file sees the full image,
and then, after seeing the image, makes a judgment about whether the
file is child pornography.”46 Second, the holding of the Jacobsen opinion
is premised, in part, on the proposition that, like a chemical test, a “ca-
nine sniff” test is not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection because
“the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics.”47 And,
because the field test could reveal “no other arguably ‘private’ fact,” the
test “compromise[d] no legitimate privacy interest.”48 Far from a “sniff
test” (or a chemical test), an “investigative technique [that] is much less
intrusive than a typical search” as exemplified in Jacobsen, a visual search
significantly jeopardizes the sense of security that is distinct from the hash
analysis because more is learned than the mere presence or absence of
child pornography.49 A visual confirmation, for example, could help de-
termine the identity, gender, location, time, and possibly the approximate
41. United States v. Reddick, No. 2:16-CR-928, 2017 WL 1353803, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 13, 2017), aff’d, 900 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added).
42. Reddick, 900 F.3d at 639 (quoting United States v. Larman, 547 F. App’x 475, 477
(5th Cir. 2013)).
43. Id. at 640.
44. See Orin S. Kerr, Opening a File Whose Hash Matched Known Child Pornography
Is Not a ‘Search,’ Fifth Circuit Rules, LAWFARE (Aug. 18, 2018, 10:09 AM), https://www
.lawfareblog.com/opening-file-whose-hash-matched-known-child-pornography-not-search-
fifth-circuit-rules [https://perma.cc/Q8QL-BAFW].
45. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984).
46. Kerr, supra note 44. Professor Kerr is a learned scholar of criminal procedure and
computer crime law.
47. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707
(1983)).
48. Id. at 123.
49. Id. at 124; see also Kerr, supra note 44.
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age of the victim. It may also disclose incriminating information such as
the presence of the accused in those images. The consequent legal ques-
tion, then, is whether a positive identification of one or more victims in
the pictures following the detective’s viewing of the files is consistent with
the Fourth Amendment.50 Reddick suggests the answer is yes.
In concluding that the detective’s viewing was not a “significant expan-
sion” of the private search, the Reddick opinion can be read as taking the
position that the officer did not exceed the prior private search when he
examined these files perhaps more thoroughly or in a different manner.
However, the proper test concerning additional invasions of privacy by
the government, as announced in Jacobsen, “must be tested by the degree
to which they exceeded the scope of the private search,” not whether the
government exceeds the scope of a private search when it examines the
same materials as the private party in a more thorough or different man-
ner.51 The Jacobsen formulation made clear that the government’s ability
to conduct a warrantless follow-up search is expressly circumscribed by
the scope of the private search because the detective’s authority to dupli-
cate a private search is distinct from his authority to conduct an indepen-
dent search.52 The test of degree is subtle but significant, for it recognizes
any residual privacy must not be unduly infringed. The Reddick frame-
work, on the other hand, would effectively and impermissibly subsume
the government search and eliminate any privacy interests altogether fol-
lowing a private search. Accordingly, unlike Jacobsen, the revelation of
intimate information by a visual confirmation should not obviate the war-
rant requirement because it could reveal other “private” facts, thereby
compromising the owner’s privacy interest associated with that search.
Although Reddick was not analyzed under Walter, that case involved
facts significantly analogous to those present in Reddick.53 Like Walter,
Microsoft’s conclusion that the files were child pornography was based
solely on the hash labels.54 The detective had possession of Reddick’s
files for nearly a month before a warrant was issued.55 Despite the court’s
view that the detective’s viewing of the images was merely to confirm his
suspicion, it was obvious that his reason for opening the files was an ef-
fort to search for evidence of a federal crime. Indeed, prior to the detec-
tive’s viewing, police could only draw inferences about the contents of the
files based on the hash values. The fact that the police might have proba-
ble cause, borne out by the private search, to believe the image files were
child pornography and that the user had committed an offense would not
alter the need to comply with the warrant requirement because the hash
50. See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 465 (5th Cir. 2001) (leaving this issue
open).
51. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115.
52. See id. at 117–18.
53. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 651–52 (1980).
54. United States v. Reddick, No. 2:16-CR-928, 2017 WL 1353803, at *3 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 13, 2017), aff’d, 900 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2018).
55. See id.
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values alone were not sufficient to support a conviction. Thus, the of-
ficer’s subsequent viewing of the files made clear that further investiga-
tion of the contents of the files was necessary to obtain the evidence
which was to be used at trial. Therefore, whatever expectation of privacy
in the hash values of Reddick’s files was frustrated as a result of a private
search does not automatically negate the warrant requirement and justify
a complete invasion of privacy in his files.56
Notably, the Fifth Circuit attempted to contrast its holding with United
States v. Ackerman.57 Ackerman involved the NCMEC’s warrantless
viewing of an email and three images of child pornography whose hash
values did not correspond to known images of child pornography.58 Al-
though the Tenth Circuit overruled the district court’s denial of the mo-
tion to suppress for reasons not at issue in Reddick, the Ackerman court
signaled its stance that when a government agent opened an email after a
private party had run a hash on the email, it exceeded rather than simply
repeated the private party’s search.59
To be sure, Professor Kerr has posited that the same result could be
reached in Reddick under the single-purpose container doctrine.60 Profes-
sor Kerr explains:
It seems at least plausible that this could apply to opening a file with
a known hash. If you know that a particular image has a particular
hash, and you then have a file with that hash, then the information
you have before you open the file “clearly announce[s] its contents
. . . by its distinctive configuration” so that “its contents are obvious
to an observer.” The contents “can be inferred by [the file’s] outward
appearance,” at least if you take “appearance” to include the hash
value of the file.61
Ordinarily, police officers must secure a warrant before they may open
a closed container because a person maintains a reasonable expectation
of privacy by concealing the contents from plain view.62 The single-pur-
pose container exception permits the pre-warrant search of a container
that is “so distinctive that its contents are a foregone conclusion and can
therefore be said to be in plain view.”63 The Fifth Circuit has adopted a
narrow view of this exception.64 In United States v. Villarreal, the court
affirmed the suppression of evidence when custom agents, without a war-
56. See Walter, 447 U.S. at 659.
57. 831 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 2016).
58. Id. at 1294, 1308 (finding NCMEC was a governmental entity or agent).
59. Id. at 1306 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984))
(“NCMEC’s search of the email itself quite easily ‘could [have] disclose[d]’ information
previously unknown to the government besides whether the one attachment contained
contraband.”).
60. Kerr, supra note 44.
61. Id.
62. See United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1992).
63. Allison M. Lucier, Comment, You Can Judge a Container by Its Cover: The Single-
Purpose Container Exception and the Fourth Amendment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1809, 1809
(2009).
64. Villarreal, 963 F.2d at 776 (citing Walter, 447 U.S. at 649).
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rant, opened one of the containers labeled as phosphoric acid and discov-
ered marijuana inside after their drug-sniffing canine alerted them to the
containers. 65 The court rejected the government’s view that the contents
of the containers could be inferred from the description on the labels.66
The court held that the owners did not surrender their expectations of
privacy simply because the exterior descriptions on a container may re-
veal some information about its contents.67 Citing Walter, the court
stated, “If the government seeks to learn more than the label reveals by
opening the container, it generally must obtain a search warrant.”68 In
effect, the court’s analysis removed any doubt that the label on the
container was not part of the “outward appearance” of the container.69
Similarly here, application of the Villareal analysis militates for the
finding that the hash value of each file is excluded from the “appearance”
of the electronic file. Like Villareal, the individual computer files con-
cealed their contents from plain view. In this context, the hash values
themselves, albeit exposed to plain view, did not remove the owner’s ex-
pectation that those contents would remain free from inspection by the
government. Thus, their contents could not be inferred simply by looking
at files, unless the hash value of each file is to be considered as part of the
“appearance” of the file. To read “appearance” broadly is to contravene
Villareal.
In sum, child pornography makes a difficult case. The Fifth Circuit’s
broad construction of the private search doctrine in Reddick is a vexing
development, incompatible with Walter and Jacobsen, and hostile to the
Framers’ aim “‘to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police
surveillance.’”70 Reddick further implicates a potential split with the
Tenth Circuit on whether the opening of a file after a private party’s hash
analysis exceeds the scope of the private search. The Reddick court cer-
tainly could have achieved the same result by affirming the district court’s
decision on a narrower ground—that is to say, the good-faith exception
applied. Even if the good-faith doctrine did not apply, the detective’s affi-
davit gave the district court a substantial basis for concluding that there
was probable cause to search Reddick’s residence. Instead, the Fifth Cir-
cuit legitimizes unreasonable police tactics and gives the police greater
rein to search, despite existing probable cause sufficient to secure a
warrant.
65. Id. at 772–73, 777.
66. Id. at 776.
67. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980) (stating despite the fact that
the incriminating nature of the contents of the films was depicted on the individual con-
tainers, the unauthorized viewing of the films constituted a Fourth Amendment violation).
Compare id., with United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The defen-
dant’s expectation of privacy in the contents of the container has already been frustrated
because the contents were rendered obvious by the [private party’s viewing of the
images].”).
68. Villarreal, 963 F.2d at 776.
69. See id. at 775–76 (“[A] label on a container is not an invitation to search it.”).
70. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (quoting United States v.
Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
